

On the intervention of the Earl of Cambridge's army in the war between Portugal and Castile (1381-1382). The requisition of horses and its social consequences

Sobre a intervenção do contingente militar do Conde de Cambridge na guerra de Portugal contra Castela (1381-1382). A requisição de cavalos e suas consequências sociais

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Abstract

The presence of a host of English mercenaries from the fleet of the Earl of Cambridge in Portugal during the third war of the Portuguese king Fernando against Castile (1381-82) fits into the wider framework of the Hundred Years' War. To furnish these men with steeds, the Portuguese king resorted to requisitioning horses from the local population. In this article, we present a set of royal chancery documents regarding this requisition that enlighten us on the privileges granted by the Portuguese Crown to the kingdom's inhabitants subjected to military service. This documentary information is then compared with the accounts

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of the chronicler Fernão Lopes about the activity of these English mercenaries in the Portuguese territory.

Keywords

Anglo-Portuguese alliance; English mercenaries; Edmund of Cambridge; War in the Iberian Peninsula.

Resumo

A presença em Portugal de um contingente de mercenários ingleses integrados na frota de Conde de Cambridge durante a terceira guerra do rei português D. Fernando contra Castela (1381-82) enquadra-se no contexto da Guerra dos Cem Anos. Para montar esses homens, o rei recorreu à requisição de cavalos à população. Apresenta-se aqui um conjunto de documentos régios que referem essa requisição e que nos iluminam sobre os privilégios concedidos pela coroa portuguesa aos moradores do reino sujeitos à prestação de um serviço militar. Essa informação documental é depois cotejada com os relatos do cronista Fernão Lopes acerca da atuação destes mercenários ingleses em terra lusitana.

Palavras-chave

Aliança anglo-portuguesa; mercenários ingleses; Edmund de Cambridge; guerra na Península Ibérica

1. Presentation of the sources

1.1. Documentary sources: the Chancery Books

The set of documents we will analyse in this study is included in one of the Chancery Books of the reign of Dom Fernando (1367-83)¹. The royal Chancery was the division of the Curia in charge of drawing up and authenticating the monarch's deeds and charters, as well as safekeeping and affixing the royal seal to documentation. In Portugal, the practice of recording documentation issued by the Chancery in a special book began in 1217². Since the 1280s and 1290s, the documents recorded in the Chancery Books have predominantly been written in Portuguese. Some documents were still written in Latin until the end of the reign of King João I (1385-1433), but these were mostly letters appointing clerics to churches in the kingdom.

1 This documentation has never been published, although it is available online at the official site of the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo: <https://digitarq.arquivos.pt/>

2 Maria Alegria Marques and João Soalheiro, *A Corte dos primeiros reis de Portugal. Afonso Henriques. Sancho I. Afonso II.* (Gijón, 2009) p.169.

We should keep in mind that, at the time, the royal court was still itinerant, although in the 14th century there was a tendency for monarchs to limit their range of travel somewhat, and favour some locations with longer stays. In the case of King Fernando, his journeys were mostly concentrated in the Lisbon-Santarém-Évora triangle (i.e. the centre-south of the Portuguese territory). During the 14th century, and until the middle of the 15th century, the Chancellor was one of the servants who generally accompanied the king on at least part of his journeys³. The topographical references associated with the date of the documents recorded in the Chancery Books have therefore been used as a valuable source for reconstructing royal itineraries.

The Royal Chancery Books are the most important collection of Portuguese medieval documents. However, for various reasons, this collection isn't complete for any reign of any monarch: many books are missing, and even those that have survived have several gaps in them, either because of missing folios or because they are partially illegible. Apart from the usual factors that explain the disappearance of such ancient documentation, in the case of the Portuguese Chanceries there is an additional factor to consider: in 1459, king Afonso V (1449-1481) ordered that the documents in these collections were to be reformed, with the aim of facilitating documentary research. Concordantly, a selection of documents was carried out; any records from previous chanceries that were still deemed useful were copied, after which the original records were destroyed. We reiterate that the new copies did not fully transcribe every document recorded in the original Books, but only part of them (the ones deemed worthy of preservation, either because they were considered more relevant or more useful at the time). Many documents were also not transcribed in their entirety, but only summarized as a sort of 'menu', which allows us a glimpse at the document's general contents but omits all their detailed information⁴. In the case of the Chancery of king Fernando, we have the immense fortune of having two surviving books of originals! It is in one of these precious books (Book no. 3) that we find the documents we are going to analyse.

3 Rita Costa Gomes, *The Making of a Court Society. Kings and Nobles in Late Medieval Portugal* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 53.

4 Armando Luís de Carvalho Homem, *O Desembargo Régio (1320-1433)* (Oporto, 1990), p. 94.

1.2. Narrative sources: the *Chronicle of D. Fernando*, by Fernão Lopes

Another source we will use in this study is a literary or narrative source: the chronicle written by Fernão Lopes dedicated to king Fernando. Fernão Lopes was the greatest Portuguese chronicler. He was born between 1380 and 1390 and must have died old, shortly after 1459. In 1418, he was appointed *guardador das escrituras do tombo* (keeper of records), a position he retired from in 1454 because he was ‘old and weak’. In 1434, the new king, D. Duarte (1433-1438), son of Philippa of Lancaster and grandson of John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster, commissioned him to write the chronicles of the former kings of Portugal, a task in which he was replaced in 1451 by Gomes Eanes de Zurara⁵.

It is not our purpose here to make an appreciation of the beauty, the literary value or the psychological insight of the narratives of the notable royal biographer, but only to recall their historiographical quality. Fernão Lopes stands out for the originality and professionalism of his historical research process: taking advantage of his role as an archivist, apart from various literary sources (such as Portuguese or foreign chronicles, namely Iberian⁶) he also used a great variety of documents (such as letters, treaties, court proceedings, among others)⁷ and even oral reports (from contemporary witnesses still at the royal court) to reconstruct the events he narrated in a detailed and exciting way.

The core of Fernão Lopes’ historiographical output is the trilogy made up of the chronicles of D. Pedro (1357-1367), D. Fernando (1367-1383) and D. João I (1385-1433). This set of texts is a coherent and detailed work, with a sophisticated narrative strategy. This is not the place to discuss the author’s impartiality, who wrote a few decades after the

5 On Fernão Lopes, see Teresa Amado, *Fernão Lopes, contador de História. Sobre a Crónica de D. João I* (Lisbon 1991), *passim*, e João Gouveia Monteiro, *Nuno Álvares Pereira. Guerreiro, Senhor feudal e Santo. Os três rostos do Condestável* (Lisbon, 2017), pp. 51-67. Additionally: the introduction to *Fernão Lopes: The English in Portugal 1383-1387*, extracts from the chronicles of Dom Fernando and Dom João / Fernão Lopes, with an introduction, translation and notes by Derek W. Lomax e R.J. Oakley (Warminster, 1988); and Peter Russell, *As fontes de Fernão Lopes*, Portuguese translation (Coimbra, 1941).

6 Fernão Lopes makes extensive use of the information provided by Pero López de Ayala in his *Crónicas* of Enrique II and Juan I of Castile.

7 As keeper of the records at the Torre do Tombo – the tower in Saint George’s Castle in Lisbon in which the royal records were kept - Fernão Lopes had privileged access to a great deal of documentation.

events which he chronicled. Chroniclers make choices, which is to say, some matters they silence, they foster associations of ideas in the reader, sometimes they say almost as much between the lines as they do in the lines themselves. Great care must be taken when using narrative sources of this sort, but, at the same time, it is impossible not to recognise their usefulness: without Fernão Lopes' contribution we would know much less about Portuguese political, military and diplomatic history, especially for the years between 1357 (the beginning of D. Pedro's reign) and 1411 (the year in which the Portuguese-Castilian peace was signed).

Despite his familiarity with the documents, making use of Fernão Lopes's chronicles requires that we take into account the cultural, political and even ideological framework in which the writer worked. We know that in 1443 he was writing the final chapter of the First Part of the *Chronicle of João I*. We can therefore surmise that he wrote his trilogy during the reign of D. Duarte (1433-38) and the regency of Prince D. Pedro (1438/9-1448)⁸.

D. Duarte must have defined the general political guidelines of the biographies he commissioned from Fernão Lopes, who, by taking on the duties of chief chronicler, shouldered the heavy responsibility of legitimising the new dynasty that won the throne by strength of arms (confirmed at Aljubarrota, on 14 August 1385). Of course, this conditioned the image his chronicles transmitted of their protagonists. Rather simplistically, Fernão Lopes's aim can be said to have been making D. João I shine. This is why the image he renders of the previous king - whom he criticises for the purposeless wars in which he got involved against Castile, and for being excessive weak with his queen Leonor Teles - is not the most approving. As a result, Fernando was forever branded as an unloved king, and his reign is perhaps not properly understood - not even today⁹.

Still, though those circumstances behoove us to be prudent, they do not invalidate the utility of most of the accounts contained in Fernão Lopes' chronicles. To take full advantage of them, it is necessary that we know how to cross-check them carefully against the available documentary sources.

8 Prince Pedro, the older brother of Prince Henry 'the Navigator' (both sons of Philippa of Lancaster and grandsons of John of Gaunt), was one of the leaders in the conquest of Ceuta in 1415. He was a well-travelled and cultured man, and was made a knight of the Order of the Garter in England. He died at the end of the short Portuguese civil war which culminated in the battle of Alfarrobeira in 1449, after having ruled the country for a decade.

9 With the exception of the studies by Armando Martins, *D. Fernando, O Formoso, 1367-1383* (Lisbon, 2009) and Rita Costa Gomes, *D. Fernando* (Lisbon, 2009).

2. What the documents tell us

With the sources presented, let us then proceed to their analysis¹⁰. Let us take (albeit virtually) Book 3 of the Chancery of D. Fernando¹¹ and open it at folio 8, verso. The document we are interested in is the first one, which we shall transcribe it in its entirety, but first let us look at the folio in which it is inserted.

This folio contains four documents, and it is immediately apparent that the first and fourth records are crossed out and signed in a darker shade of brown ink than the original writing, indicating that they do not belong to the group of documents that were meant to be copied. The second and third documents are written in Latin and, perhaps for that reason, are marked (in the same darker ink) with a small hand-shaped pointer in the left margin. As for the fourth and last document, it is a letter of pardon to a resident of the city of Oporto, guilty of the death of another; it was granted in Évora, on 27 April 1382. Although there is no explicit mention of why clemency was show to him, that the king should grant a pardon in such a context of war is highly suggestive.

The explanation for the exclusion (i.e. for not copying) of two records (those corresponding to the first and fourth documents) from this folio seems simple: they are too ‘personal’, in the sense that they concern individual persons, and therefore would no longer be of much interest (or even validity) eight decades later, when copies of some of these documents were made. Those documents concerned an ordinary person only, and the privileges enshrined therein would no longer be of interest even to his descendants.

Let us now look in more detail at the first document recorded on the verso of folio 8 of Book 3 of the Chancery of Dom Fernando¹². The document is a *carta de pousado*, i.e. a charter by which the monarch grants one of his subjects their retirement, exempting them from their military obligations (which in this specific case include owning a horse). This

10 In the interests of saving space, and since the documents in question are of the same type, we shall transcribe only one of them and analyse in more detail the folio in which it is recorded, by way of example and to make the context of the official record more explicit.

11 This book of records of the Royal Chancery (original, let's not forget) is composed of 96 folios and contains documents dating between 1381 and 1383.

12 Access to the Chancery Books of D. Fernando: <https://digitalq.arquivos.pt/viewer?id=3813660> Reference code for Book 3 - PT/TT/CHR/F/001/0003. Folio 8 verso is the image - PT-TT-CHR-F-001-0003_m0020.TIF

concession to João Gonçalves was made under the same conditions as those provided for those who obtained identical privileges for having reached the age of 70: exemption from paying the *jugada* (see below), dispensation from owning a horse, and dispensation from serving over land and over sea, even if they were assessed as having the 'contia dobrada' (i.e. even if they had twice the income required to be included in the military bracket of the 'aquantiados em cavalo e armas', which we will discuss later). The explanation for granting such a boon to the porter from Santarém is simple enough: he had provided a horse for the 'encavalgaduras' of the English; that is, in 1381, João Gonçalves had delivered a horse which was put at the service of the English mercenaries who came to Portugal in the Earl of Cambridge's fleet.

We have been able to identify, in total, four more documents with exactly the same content in Book 3 of D. Fernando's Chancery: letters of retirement granted as a result of supplying mounts for the English mercenaries¹³. The four beneficiaries were:

- Domingos Perez da Arrantela, a resident of Almada. Letter given in Lisbon, on 14 December [1381]¹⁴ (fol. 1, doc 4).
- Fernam Perez, cooper, resident in Lisbon. Letter given in the city of Lisbon, on 8 December 1381 (fol. 1 verso, doc 1).
- Gonçalo Domingues, resident in Sant'Antoninho. Letter given in Lisbon, on 8 November 1381 (fol. 2, doc 3).
- Afonso Anaao, resident in Évoramonte. Letter given in Évora, on 21 February 1382 (fol. 9, doc 3).

It should be noted that four of the five documents above were granted in Lisbon, on very close dates¹⁵, while the remaining one was issued in Évora a few months later¹⁶.

13 We transcribe only the document concerning the porter João Gonçalves because the privileges granted in the other charters, as well as the reason given for granting them, are precisely the same.

14 Critical dating. By mistake, the clerk recorded the year one thousand four hundred and ten (i.e. he forgot the ninth). All the other documents in this folio (as well as in the following folio) are dated to the year one thousand four hundred and nineteen, corresponding to the year 1381.

15 On 7 August; on 8 November; and on 8 and 14 December, 1381.

16 On 21 February, 1382.

3. The system of ‘aquantiados’ in horse and/or armaments

3.1. Who are the ‘aquantiados’?

To understand the content of these documents it is necessary to explain the military recruitment system at the time in Portugal¹⁷. It is worth remembering that this was still a non-permanent army, recruited on an *ad hoc* basis to meet the specific needs of a given campaign. The royal host comprised four main types of troops: the combatants of the nobility; the individuals recruited in the municipalities (either as *aquantiados* or as *besteiros do conto*¹⁸); the forces of the Military Orders (at the end of the 14th century: Order of Christ, Santiago, Avis, and Hospitallers); and small groups of mercenaries, or of *homiziados* (men condemned by justice, but who could see their sentence commuted if they joined the royal host).

Of these, we should look more closely at the *aquantiados*. Fortunately, we possess an important source for studying them: the *Ordenações Afonsinas* (Afonso's Ordinances)¹⁹, a collection of laws and other legal sources completed in the mid-15th century, within which we can find a *Regimento dos Coudéis*²⁰ (Ordinances of the *Coudéis*) drawn up by Prince D. Duarte (future king) in 1418. As with any piece of medieval legislation, this document raises some doubts as to its practical application; moreover, it is dated slightly later than the period we're harkening back to (although it does echo earlier usages and customs). These two caveats notwithstanding, we will make specific use of the *Regimento dos Coudéis* of 1418, as this document provides us with an enormous and precious variety of important details about how the *aquantiados* system functioned.

17 On military recruitment, see what we wrote in João Gouveia Monteiro, ‘De D. Afonso IV (1325) à Batalha de Alfarrobeira (1449) – Os Desafios da Maturidade’, in *Nova História Militar de Portugal*, Vol. I, coordinated by Manuel Themudo Barata and Nuno Severiano Teixeira (Lisbon, 2003), pp. 192 and 195-200 (at pp. 163-287).

18 The *besteiros do conto* (lit. ‘crossbowmen of the count’) were crossbowmen who were recruited from amongst the municipalities’ artisans, in a fixed or certain number (the *conto* or count/amount), determined by the king in relation to the demographic resources of the town in question. In 1421 there were around 5 000 *besteiros do conto* in Portugal, divided into 300 recruitment units (the *anelarias*, which owed their name to the title of the person in charge: the *anel*, an officer appointed by the king).

19 *Ordenações Afonsinas*, Introductory note by Mário Júlio Almeida e Costa; textological note by Eduardo Borges Nunes (Lisbon, 1984), 4 volumes.

20 *Ordenações Afonsinas*, Book I, pp. 473-520 (Title LXXI *Dos Coudees, e Regimentos, que a seus officios pertencem*). Hereafter referred to in simplified form as the *Regimento dos Coudéis*.

Those inhabitants of the kingdom who had their own household (whether married or single, or even clerics of the minor orders) were obliged to possess a certain amount of military equipment, according to their personal wealth. Exceptions to this were beneficed clerics (of holy or religious orders), knights, the king's vassal squires and also noble squires on their mother's and father's side. The military force thus recruited was called *aquantiadados*, since their obligation to present themselves to the royal army with specific military equipment was predicated upon the *quantia* (quantity, amount, value) of their estate. The *coudéis* (officers nominated by the king, referred to in these documents), assisted by one or two 'homens-bons of the council' (the municipal oligarchy), assessed the estate and attributed each individual their corresponding military duties. These evaluations were then registered by the clerks of the *coudéis* in their own specific books (none of which seems to have survive, unfortunately). The *coudéis* (supervised by a *coudel-mor* of the kingdom) were also responsible for supervising the presence of the *aquantiadados* and their respective equipment in periodic inspections (known as *alardos*²¹) and, whenever necessary, mobilising them for military campaigns summoned by the monarch.

The categories into which *aquantiadados* were subdivided ranged from the minimum obligation of owning a shield or a lance to, as one was placed in a higher bracket due to personal wealth, more sophisticated weaponry (for example: owning a crossbow); at the top of the hierarchy, possession of a good horse was required! This latter instance still accounted for two possible scenarios: owning a 'simple' horse (i.e. only the horse itself was mandatory); or, for the richest *aquantiadados* of all, a complete set (offensive and defensive) of military equipment, along with a good horse. Assessments always prompted many complaints, particularly because of the contentious decisions over which possessions could be included or excluded from the calculation.

Ascertaining the exact amounts that defined how municipal populations were split into different brackets is a somewhat complex exercise, for several reasons. On the one hand, there seem to have been considerable fluctuations over time, due to the peculiar political and military circumstances of each reign. Secondly, the economic asymmetries between

21 Chapter XV of the *Regimento dos Coudéis* advises the clerk to take note of the age, colour and condition of the horses, as well as the *aquantiado*'s age and 'disposição' (disposition, i.e. apparent health).

the kingdom's many regions caused these values to shift and vary: for example, the *quantias* that made it necessary to own a horse were distinctly lower in those regions blessed with good conditions for breeding these animals, as well as in regions closer to the border with Castile. In addition to this, there was a great monetary devaluation during Fernando's reign. In the 1371 *Cortes* of Lisbon, the people asked the monarch for *quantias* to be multiplied 'quatro dobro' (i.e. four fold) in each region, or for their possessions to be valued at what they were worth 'antes desta moeda' (before the then current coinage), which had already been debased. In his reply, the king accepted that 'enquanto esta moeda correr' (as long as that coinage was in circulation), the amounts would be quadrupled²². In 1372, local representatives once again complained about the high prices and asked the king that the sums of 500 pounds for horses and weapons for the king's service be doubled; and that the valuation not include dwellings, clothes and 'beds', as well as wine cellars and other things that did not generate any income²³.

Medieval documentation clearly shows that to be *aquantiado em armas* (obliged to own arms) and, above all, *aquantiado em cavalo* (obliged to own a horse; or *cavalo e armas*, obliged to own both a horse and arms) was a heavy burden, which all those who could did their best to be exempted from. Understandable, given the obligations they were subjected to: buying and maintaining a good horse was very expensive, an investment which wasn't compensated by the (somewhat modest) privileges that, at least from a certain period onwards, the monarch granted them. We emphasise that the *aquantitados* had the onerous duty of acquiring and maintaining the arms and/or the horse, which their respective *quantias* required, but they also had to present them in good condition whenever they were called to war (or simply for a periodic review, which in the case of the *aquantitados em cavalo* had to take place three or four times a year, at fixed dates). Conversely, as we have already suggested, they enjoyed some relatively limited and well-controlled privileges²⁴. One of these privileges (expressly referred to in the documents under analysis) consisted of the exemption from pay-

22 *Cortes Portuguesas. Reinado de D. Fernando I (1367-1383). Volume I (1367-1380)*. Prepared by A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Nuno José Pizarro Pinto Dias and João Paulo Salvado (Lisbon, 1990-1993). *Cortes de Lisboa -1371*, article 27, pp. 27-28

23 *Ibid.* *Cortes de Leiria - 1372*, article 23, pp 134-135.

24 These privileges consisted, essentially, in being exempted from services to the local council and the payment of some taxes. Chapter XI of the Regiment of the *Coudéis* deals with the privileges of the *aquantitados em cavalo*.

ing *jugada* – a payment which was due for cultivating the land with a certain number of yokes of oxen, proportional to the number of *jugos* or yokes (i.e. pairs of oxen). This was a relevant exemption, and it was no coincidence that in 1393, João I²⁵ recalled that Fernando had granted letters to those who had relinquished horses for the English or other persons in the king's service, exempting them from owning horses and paying *jugada* and *oitavo*²⁶. But the new king no longer seemed very interested in maintaining these exemptions, for he now commanded them to pay *jugada* and *oitava*, if they had no horses...

The onerous duty of being an *aquantiado em cavalo* and/or *em armas* ended with retirement, which was generally granted to *aquantiados* when they reached 70 years of age or more, or for any reason of *force majeure*. The *aquantiado pousado* (i.e. retired) was then exempted from various municipal payments and charges, namely from paying the *jugada* and *oitava* (unless his *quantia* was 'doubled' and he didn't own a horse). The *Regimento dos Coudéis* of 1418 ordered that *aquantiados pousados* assessed at twice the minimum amount required to have a horse actually had to own one²⁷. That is precisely what the allusions to a *contia dobrada* in these documents refer to.

Although men were needed for war, the Crown often bowed to the pressure of requests and was perhaps rather generous in granting the boon of exemption from *aquantiado* status. Let us look specifically at some examples of letters from D. Fernando, a monarch who sought above all to use this concession as an incentive towards various objectives²⁸:

- to reward important trades or activities: in 1371, the king excused an officer of the mint from owning a horse and arms²⁹; in 1378, he exempted the rectors, doctors, masters and bachelors of the University of Lisbon from owning horses³⁰.

25 Chancery of D. João I, Book 2, folio 110 v.

26 «Oitavo»: lit. 'one-eighth'. Rent paid by tenants over what they produced.

27 *Regimento dos Coudéis*, chapter XV, *Ordenações D. Duarte*, p. 609.

28 We only mention cases from Fernando's reign. A wider exploration can be found in João Gouveia Monteiro, *A Guerra em Portugal nos finais da Idade Média* (Lisbon, 1998) p. 52, which include examples from the reigns of D. João I and D. Duarte, in which the exemption of owning horse and arms is granted on the grounds of simple personal or religious sympathies.

29 Chancery of D. Fernando, Book 4, folio 2.

30 Chancery of D. Fernando, Book 4, folio 12 and 12v.

- to foster the settlement of walled towns and castles: in 1372, he exempted the inhabitants living inside Coimbra's walls from owning horses, even if they had enough money to be obliged to own one; however, the monarch stressed that they would have to have weapons for the defence of their city³¹.
- to populate deserted or frontier places: in 1380, he exempted the inhabitants of Lavar (Montemo-o-Novo) from owning horses and weapons against their will, as it was one of the places of the kingdom that most needed to be populated³².

Occasionally, but exceptionally, the monarch authorised *aquantidados em cavalos e armas* of a certain municipality to present two harnesses instead, or else a *arnês comprido* (i.e. a full harness) along with a cranequin crossbow³³. The terms under which this replacement was authorised show how costly horses were.

3.2. *The importance of horses*

Due to its qualities of bravery, speed, endurance and generosity, the horse was recognised as indispensable for any demanding military movement. Apart from their direct intervention in combat, horses were crucial for the movement of support trains. Moreover, a style of war of speed, of raiding, such as the one traditionally practised in the medieval Iberian Peninsula, could not be carried out without good mounts: they allowed dazzling attacks, timely retreats or, defensive patrols. As horses needed grass, water and fodder, they ended up restricting, to a great extent, how and where an army marched through. A good horse could cover 40 to 48 km per day³⁴. If medieval warfare (since the High Middle Ages) was mostly carried out during spring and summer months, this was mainly due to the military relevance of horses, whose need for abundant pastures could only be satisfied during those seasons³⁵.

31 Chancery of D. Fernando, Book 1, folio 113v.

32 Chancery of D. Fernando, Book 2, folio 57v– 58.

33 See examples in João Gouveia Monteiro, *A Guerra em Portugal nos finais da Idade Média* (Lisbon, 1998) p. 48. The cranequin (*garrucha* in Portuguese) was an accessory which used a rack and pinion system of gears to help reload a crossbow.

34 James Powers, *A Society organized for war. The Iberian municipal militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284* (Berkeley-Los Angeles, London, 1988) pp. 159-161.

35 We recall Charlemagne's abnormal passivity in 791-793, a period in which, faced with several military crises, he extraordinarily remained in Regensburg. Today we know that this was because of an equine epidemic which, according to the *Annales Regni*

As we can see, it was particularly burdensome to be included in the *aquantiado* bracket with the obligation of owning a horse. First, it was necessary to acquire the animal – and a riding horse cost far more than a peasant's work horse³⁶. Moreover, the deadlines stipulated by monarchs for the acquisition or replacement of steeds were tight, and were therefore often contested by municipal representatives. For example, in the Cortes of Lisbon of 1371³⁷, the people asked the king for a one-year deadline to present or replace a horse, but the king refused the request. It should be noted that the *Regimento dos Coudéis* stipulates a period of four months for new *aquantidados* to present their horses and arms; if they sell their mounts, they are obliged to present others to replace them; the same rules also stipulate a one-year period for replacing dead, lame or sick horses³⁸.

After purchase, horses had to be properly maintained³⁹. Difficulties were experienced throughout several reigns and in all the regions of the kingdom (with the exception of the region of Entre-Tejo-e-Guadiana, in southern Portugal). People complained, in particular, about the land being 'minguada dos mantimentos' (short of supplies) necessary for raising horses.

Moreover, many horse owners were plagued by a very harmful and long-standing practice: a tendency for powerful people misappropri-

Francorum, resulted in only a tenth of the horses surviving the pestilence. See Carroll Gillmor, 'The 791 Equine Epidemic and its Impact on Charlemagne's Army', in *Journal of Medieval Military History*, vol. III, ed. Kelly DeVries and Clifford J. Rogers (Woodbridge, 2005), pp. 23-24 (at pp. 23-45).

36 Price comparisons are always difficult, but from the reign of Fernando until the end of the 15th century, they are particularly risky due to the impressive rates of monetary depreciation. See Maria José Pimenta Ferro Tavares, *Para o estudo da numária de D. Fernando* (Oporto, 1982).

37 *Cortes Portuguesas. Reinado de D. Fernando I (1367-1383). Volume I (1367-1380)*. Prepared by A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Nuno José Pizarro Pinto Dias and João Paulo Salvado (Lisbon, 1990-1993). Cortes de Lisboa -1371, article 7, p. 52.

38 *Regimento dos Coudéis*, chapter VI - deadlines given to *aquantidados* for the presentation of horses and arms.

39 It should be noted that the *Regimento dos Coudéis*, in the chapter IX, gives detailed instructions on how to take care of the horses, and even specifies the months in which they should be released to pasture. On breeding and maintaining horses in medieval Portugal, see: Carlos Afonso, 'A guerra cristã na formação de Portugal, 1128-1249' (Lisbon, 2021). Doctoral thesis, still unpublished, pp. 252-256; Miguel Gomes Martins, *A arte da guerra em Portugal, 1245 a 1367* (Coimbra, 2014), pp. 267-288; and João Gouveia Monteiro, *A Guerra em Portugal nos finais da Idade Média* (Lisbon, 1998) pp. 151-162. For a better framing, see also R.H.C. Davis, *The Medieval Warhorse. Origin, Development and Redevelopment* (London, 1989) and Andrew Ayton, *Knights and Warhorses. Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III* (Woodbridge, 1994).

ating the horses of the kingdom's inhabitants, without due monetary compensation; sometimes, it was the king himself (or the members of his Household) who acted in this way. In the *Cortes* of Lisbon of 1371, the people complained that magistrates and *coudéis* would requisition mules and horses and then keep them or return them in a poor state. The monarch justified those actions whilst promising not to repeat them, and to compensate the victims in the meantime⁴⁰. Yet the very next year, the people once again complained that the king was taking the horses they had for the king's service, or ordering that they be taken (by the masters of the Military Orders and other great lords). They were paid a third of what they were really worth, and were then constrained to get others, which cost them good money. In response, the king acknowledges that he did this to some subjects whom he thought could not serve in arms, so that others could serve with these horses in time of war in their stead. But he promises not to repeat this practice (or allow that it be repeated)⁴¹.

For its part, the Crown was committed to having many good mounts in a kingdom that sorely lacked them. To that end, it encouraged its subjects in various ways to own and keep horses suitable for the defence of the land. Thus, it sought to grant privileges, such as the exemption from paying the *jugada* to those who owned horses to serve the king. Since the 14th century, at least, many estates were set aside with the explicit purpose of breeding mares and foals. King Fernando granted several *cartas de coutada* (letters of protection and reservation), such as one in the district of Campo Maior (Alentejo region), issued in 1368, as the owner claimed not to have access to a large enough area to be able to breed horses⁴².

Likewise, Fernando exempted *aquantiados* from owning horses so long as they had two 'éguas cavalares' (horse-breeding mares) to breed them, and on the condition that they would not breed said mares other than with horses. The monarch even gave instructions to the *meirinhos* (bailiffs) to assign, to those *aquantiados* who wanted to breed mares,

40 *Cortes Portuguesas. Reinado de D. Fernando I (1367-1383). Volume I (1367-1380)*. Prepared by A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Nuno José Pizarro Pinto Dias and João Paulo Salvado (Lisbon, 1990-1993). *Cortes de Lisboa-1371*, article 79, p. 53.

41 *Cortes Portuguesas. Reinado de D. Fernando I (1367-1383). Volume I (1367-1380)*. Prepared by A. H. de Oliveira Marques, Nuno José Pizarro Pinto Dias and João Paulo Salvado (Lisbon, 1990-1993). *Cortes do Oporto-1372*, article 9, pp. 89-90.

42 Chancery of D. Fernando, Book 1, fol. 24v, 15 March, 1368.

clear locations of fenced allotments in which they could do so, and to see to it that in each municipality (and at the expense of the municipality itself) there would be horses meant for breeding with the mares therein. As for the mares of those who were not *aquantiados*, King Fernando authorised them to breed a third of them with whatever type of mount they so wished⁴³.

Monarchs also sought to make it easier to acquire horses; hence the exemption from the *sis*a (an indirect tax on traded goods) on the purchase, sale or barter of horses. The Portuguese crown also showed some commitment to importing horses. For instance, in 1382, Fernando got Richard II of England to authorise Lord Chancellor Lourenço Anes Fogaça (sent there as an ambassador to recruit allied troops for the war against Castile) to bring over to Portugal as many horses as he wanted, without paying taxes or *fintas* (extraordinary contributions)⁴⁴.

The restrictions imposed by the monarchs on the circulation of saddled and bridled mules and hinnies were also clearly aimed at protecting horse breeding, a body of laws which took into account these animals' military usefulness. In order to counteract the tendency of his noblemen and citizens to stop owning and buying horses (replacing them by donkeys, mules, and hinnies), D. Fernando ordered that all his vassals (as well as the worthies of the royal court) who receive monies from the king to serve in war were obliged to each own his own horse; the same should apply to the Masters, commanders (fr.: "commandeur"; lat.: *preceptor*) and friars of the Military Orders. The same monarch also determined that, among all the other inhabitants (with the exception of clerics of holy orders), those who wanted to have a saddled mule should also own their horses, under penalty of losing said mules⁴⁵.

We would be remiss if we failed to draw attention to the good reputation of Iberian mounts. It seems that Iberian horses of the Late Middle Ages were of very good quality and had great endurance. The excellent horses brought to the Iberian Peninsula by the Muslims were further improved by crossbreeding with Iberian horses (Pliny, in the 1st century B.C., praised the horses from Lisbon and the Tagus valley). Hence the

43 We don't know the precise date of this Fernandine law, inserted in the *Ordenações Afonsinas*, Book V, title CXIX, paragraphs 8 to 12, pp. 397-398

44 António Resende de Oliveira and João Gouveia Monteiro, *Historia Medieval de Portugal (1096-1495)* (Granada, 2018), p. 166.

45 *Ordenações Afonsinas*, Book V, title CXIX, paragraphs 4 to 6, pp. 396-397.

traditional export of Iberian horses to England, recorded at least until the middle of the 14th century, when the Black Death caused a considerable change in this arrangement⁴⁶.

4. Fernão Lopes' supplementary information

The documents we presented provide ample proof of the military usefulness of horses. Once the contents of these documents are explained, we can now combine this information with the data provided by our main narrative source. Within Fernão Lopes' historiographical production, the chronicle that most interests us here is the *Crónica de D. Fernando*⁴⁷. This chronicle, which covers the years 1367 to 1383, consists of 178 chapters, and is dedicated at length to the three wars against Castile, their respective contexts and their consequences.

Portuguese history of the late Middle Ages cannot be understood outside its international framework, especially outside the context of the Hundred Years' War – that long conflict between France and England between 1337 and 1453, which also dragged other kingdoms along with them. In the case of the Iberian kingdoms, the two warring factions required naval support from their allies⁴⁸.

To better understand the English intervention in the Third Fernandine War against Castile (1381-1382)⁴⁹, we will try to offer an overview, albeit a brief one, of the context in which these conflicts took place⁵⁰. In

46 R.H.C. Davis, *The Medieval Warhorse. Origin, Development and Redevelopment* (London, 1989), pp. 64 e 90.

47 As we build this contextualisation, as well as the description of the events, we shall quote particularly noteworthy passages from this Chronicle: Fernão Lopes, *Crónica de Dom Fernando*. Critical edition by Giuliano Macchi (Lisbon, 1975), hereafter referred to only as *Crónica de Dom Fernando*. We will also use some extracts included in Fernão Lopes: *The English in Portugal 1383-1387 extracts from the chronicles of Dom Fernando and Dom João / Fernão Lopes*; with an introduction, translation and notes by Derek W. Lomax and R.J. Oakley (Warminster, 1988).

48 For a better understanding of the political-military reality of the various Iberian kingdoms see the recent synthesis by Francisco García Fitz and João Gouveia Monteiro (editors), *War in the Iberian Peninsula, 700-1600* (London and New York, 2018).

49 Peter Russell, *The English Intevention in Spain and Portugal in the time of Edward III and Ricardo II* (Oxford, 1955). Portuguese translation: *A Intervenção Inglesa na Península Ibérica durante a Guerra dos Cem Anos* (Lisbon, 2000). In spite of the age of the original version, this work by Sir Peter Russell is still very useful. To be complemented by Tiago Viúla de Faria, *The Politics of Anglo-Portuguese Relations and their Protagonists in the Later Middle Ages (c. 1369 - c. 1449)*, doctoral thesis (Oxford, 2013).

50 D. Fernando fought three wars against Castile: 1369-71; 1372-73; 1381-82. See a very recent synthesis in António Resende de Oliveira and João Gouveia Monteiro, *Historia*

a complex diplomatic framework marked by the Hundred Years' War, Portugal was in danger of being absorbed by the Castilian Trastamara dynasty. It was almost inevitable that Fernando would become involved in the neighbouring kingdom's internal conflicts, as many supporters of both the Count of Trastamara (Enrique) and his half-brother (King Pedro I, murdered at Montiel in 1369) had sought refuge in Portugal at different times. Moreover, Fernando was the legitimate maternal great-grandson of Sancho IV of Castile, and therefore had his own aspirations to the Castilian throne. Enticed by a few Galician noblemen, Fernando launched his first war against Castile in 1369, shortly after having concluded an alliance with the Moorish king of Granada, and another with the monarch of Aragon. But things did not go well for the Portuguese king, notably due to the failure of the Portuguese naval blockade of Seville in 1370. In March 1371, a peace treaty was signed in Alcoutim (in the Algarve), in which Fernando undertook to marry Princess Leonor, daughter of Enrique II of Castile. This agreement did not please the Aragonese king, who changed his mind. Surprised by this about-face on the part of Pedro IV of Aragon, Fernando, as covertly as he could, turned to an alliance with England⁵¹.

Suddenly, in 1371, Fernando married Leonor Teles (an already married lady, of Castilian origin) in secret, which naturally called into question the matrimonial agreement he had with Enrique II of Castile. In addition, in July 1372, the King of Portugal signed a treaty in Tagilde (Braga) with emissaries of the King of England, in which he renounced his aspirations to the throne of Castile⁵² in exchange for English military aid to Portugal when necessary. Enrique II eventually learned of this treaty and elected to invade Portugal in September 1372, thus starting the 'second Fernandine war'.

The Portuguese king asked the Duke of Lancaster for help, but the moment was less than favourable: on 22 and 23 June 1372, the English armada had been destroyed by the Castilians at La Rochelle. It is possible that, at the time, the English advised Fernando not to fight the Castilian

Medieval de Portugal (1096-1495) (Granada, 2018) pp. 154-169.

51 Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Francisco Contento Domingues and João Gouveia Monteiro, *História Militar de Portugal* (Lisbon, 2017), pp. 136-137.

52 The Duke of Lancaster, John of Gaunt, had aspirations to the throne of Castile via his second marriage in 1371 to Constance, daughter of Pedro I of Castile and his mistress, Maria de Padilla.

troops before the arrival of the English reinforcements⁵³. This may help explain Fernando's attitude and his erratic advances and retreats, even though he knew that the enemy intended to march on Lisbon, which the Castilians laid siege to in February 1373. Perhaps Fernando was trying to play for time; yet, as English help was not forthcoming, he was forced to sign a new (and humiliating) peace agreement with Enrique II in Santarém in March 1373. D. Fernando then committed himself to supporting Castile and France against England, specifically by giving up two galleys for two years. However, in June 1373, 'the Handsome' would undertake signing a new Anglo-Portuguese agreement of reciprocal military aid in London. This fact shows the double-dealing then practiced by the Portuguese diplomacy⁵⁴!

The signing of a truce in the Hundred Years' War at the end of June 1375 helped stabilise the Iberian situation, and gave Fernando time to undertake various reforms, particularly military ones (reorganising recruitment, modernising military equipment, and reforming the navy, among other aspects).

In May 1379, Enrique II died and his son Juan I ascended the throne of Castile. It is likely that Fernando saw this event as an opportunity. Duplicitous, Fernando negotiated the marriage of his only daughter, Beatriz, to the first-born son of the new King of Castile, while at the same time striving to reactivate the alliance with England. Thus, in 1380, the treaties with England were confirmed, and an English intervention was planned⁵⁵ in the Peninsula, which was to be led by the Earl of Cambridge, Edmund of Langley, brother of the Duke of Lancaster. But Juan I became aware of these negotiations, and in May 1381 took the initiative to attack the Alentejo, starting the 'third Fernandine war'.

In mid-July 1381, following the diplomatic mission of Chancellor Lourenço Anes Fogaça and squire Rui Cravo to England, the Earl of Cambridge's fleet finally arrived in Lisbon: 48 vessels, carrying nearly 3,000 well-equipped mercenaries (men-at-arms and archers), as well as some Castilian and Galician exiles. Fernão Lopes describes their arrival and the

53 See Armando Martins, *D. Fernando. O Formoso (1367-1383)*. (Lisbon, 2009), p. 62.

54 Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Francisco Contento Domingues and João Gouveia Monteiro, *História Militar de Portugal* (Lisbon, 2017), p. 138.

55 The agreement included a new prospective marriage between Princess D. Beatriz (daughter of D. Fernando and Leonor Teles) and Edward of Langley (son of the Earl of Cambridge).

welcome given to these Englishmen in Lisbon⁵⁶. The chronicler explains that the Anglo-Portuguese agreement included the proviso that Fernando would provide mounts to all the English combatants, for a price to be deducted from the wages they were entitled to receive. In light of that agreement, Fernando convened the *Cortes*⁵⁷, after which 'the King demanded all the horses of the tax-payers [aquantiados] of the realm and any other mounts that could be found, mules as well as horses, to give them to the English, who in this way were all provided with mounts. The former owners lost their best mounts on the understanding that they would be paid, but in the event they never received any payment'⁵⁸.

English intervention in Portugal would only make sense if the mercenaries were provided with good mounts; these would have to be acquired by the Portuguese king, so as to avoid having the English bringing the animals with them from the other side of the Channel (not least because horses usually suffered a lot during sea voyages)⁵⁹.

In accordance with the terms of the agreement, Dom Fernando requisitioned the best horses he could from the kingdom's *aquantiados* and from other horse owners as well, either against their wishes or in exchange for good promises, in order to safeguard the success of the much desired military intervention by Edmund, the Earl of Cambridge⁶⁰.

The documents we have presented here fit the context of this episode of forced requisitioning of horses: Fernando granted letters of privilege to a series of *aquantiados*, precisely because *in illo tempore* they had supplied the English with steeds. As we have seen, the charters were issued in Lisbon between August and December 1381⁶¹, and the expression 'ora

56 For these events see *Crónica de Dom Fernando*, chapters CXXVIII and CXXIX, p. 451-457; and also *Fernão Lopes: The English in Portugal 1383-1387 extracts from the chronicles of Dom Fernando and Dom João*; with an introduction, translation and notes by Derek W. Lomax e R.J. Oakley (Warminster, 1988), pp. 62-69.

57 *Cortes*: assemblies presided over by the king, with representatives of the nobility, the clergy and the people, which dealt with political, economic and legislative matters.

58 *Fernão Lopes: The English in Portugal 1383-1387*, p. 69; *Crónica de Dom Fernando*, chap. CXXIX, p. 456.

59 R.H.C. Davis, *The Medieval Warhorse. Origin, Development and Redevelopment* (London, 1989), p. 82.

60 As we already know, the mounts were effectively supplied by the population; and to pay the English army's wages and supplies, D. Fernando used the treasuries of the churches. See Armando Martins D. *Fernando. O Formoso (1367-1383)*. (Lisbon, 2009), p. 80.

61 The fifth document is dated February 1382, in Évora; we shall explain the circumstances of its issue below.

derom' (*ora* meaning 'now' or 'very recently') clearly indicates the chronological proximity between the two events: the requisition of the horses from the *aquantados*, and the granting of the letters by the king.

Judging from Fernão Lopes' words, we can perhaps deduce that the mounts thus raised were of good breed, but were ultimately quite badly treated at the hands of the British mercenaries: 'Many of these selected animals which they gave to the English were so wild that an Englishman could hardly lead them to water; yet as soon as they got hold of them, they handled them in such a way that later on just one Englishman could drive twenty or thirty of them before him like a herd of gentle cattle'⁶².

It wasn't only the animals who were mistreated. There was some delay in gathering the requisite mounts for transport to the border and, while waiting idly on the outskirts of Lisbon, these troops committed acts of banditry, robbing and murdering the local population. The title of chapter CXXXII of Fernão Lopes's chronicle⁶³ is very explicit: 'Of the bad behaviour of the Englishman towards the inhabitants of the kingdom, and how the King did not punish it because he needed them'⁶⁴.

We know that this expeditionary force was not very cohesive, as it was quite heterogeneous: it included Castilians, Gascon mercenaries, and poorly quality English mercenaries. As for its commander, Edmund of Cambridge, the least that can be said is that he was feeble⁶⁵.

Juan I, meanwhile, did not take advantage of this respite, perhaps due to a major miscalculation by the Castilian agents who overestimated the size of the English army⁶⁶. The inexplicable delay of the Earl of Cambridge's men, together with the rumours that John of Gaunt was planning to send a new English army to Gascony, seemed a major threat to the Castilian king, who feared being attacked on two fronts.

Thus, in August 1381, Juan formally challenged his adversaries to combat. Pero López de Ayala claims that the English, still horseless and

62 *Fernão Lopes: The English in Portugal 1383-1387*, p. 69; *Crónica de Dom Fernando*, chap. CXXIX, p. 45.

63 *Crónica de Dom Fernando*, chap. CXXXII, p. 465-67; *Fernão Lopes: The English in Portugal 1383-1387*, pp.74-78

64 *Fernão Lopes: The English in Portugal 1383-1387*, p. 75

65 Peter Russell, *A Intervenção Inglesa na Península Ibérica durante a Guerra dos Cem Anos* (Lisbon, 2000), p. 337.

66 *Idem*, p. 348.

so unable to leave Lisbon, did not respond, and imprisoned the Castilian messenger⁶⁷! This Anglo-Portuguese refusal seemed to confirm the King of Castile's fears...

Finally, in December, the English left for the border, having been placed in Alentejo (in the region of Vila Viçosa). But there, because their wages were not up to date, the English mercenaries attacked Portuguese villages, and committed such abuses against the local populations that they decided to organise themselves and killed dozens of them, almost an open war scenario.

At the beginning of 1382, Fernando moved his court to Évora; we find him there on 21 February, when he granted our fifth charter.

We will end this tale with a symbolic episode of this strange war. D. Fernando and the Earl of Cambridge gathered their forces in the region of Elvas-Badajoz, and at the end of July D. Juan assembled his host on the other side of the border. The two armies faced one another, ready to fight, for 15 days, but the battle ultimately didn't happen!

D. Fernando, perhaps because he did not feel sufficiently secure (since he had planned to receive extra help from the Duke of Lancaster, which didn't take place because John of Gaunt was held up in Flanders), or because he was already feeling very ill, opted for a secret negotiation with the King of Castile. The agreement, signed on 10 August 1382 away from the prying eyes of the English, stipulated that the Castilians would provide the ships for the English to return home, which would happen in early September. So ended the Third Fernandine War, with the lukewarm participation of the Earl of Cambridge. However, this was not the end of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, which would prove invaluable - perhaps even decisive - in the outcome of the crisis that would befall Portugal with Fernando's Death in October 1383: English military aid was crucially important to João I of Portugal at the Battle of Aljubarrota (14 August 1385), perhaps the most important battle in all of Portugal's secular history.

67 Idem, p. 351. Pero López de Ayala, *Chronicles* (Editing, prologue and notes by José-Luis Martín) (Barcelona, 1991) p. 534.

Conclusion

We were very fortunate that this original book from King Fernando's Chancery survived, since the documents we analysed have not been transcribed into any other collection. It is also fortunate that we have a chronicler such as Fernão Lopes, which allows us combine different types of sources which shed light one on the other.

This case is also a good example of the military usefulness of the socio-military group of the *aquantados*, and of the Crown's great interest in keeping its subjects equipped with horses of fighting age and in fighting condition, as well as well-maintained armaments.

It appears that the horses were never returned — or rather, that the king did not expect them to be returned, or even paid for. We may also suggest that the Portuguese king had a great interest in this requisition, insofar as granting such a handsome benefit to the *aquantados* who collaborated in the enterprise, considering that keeping a horse was an onerous duty.

Transcription⁶⁸

Dom Fernando pella graça de Deus Rey de Portugal e do Algarve aquantos esta carta virem fazemos saber que nos querendo fazer graça // e mercee a Joham Gonçalvez que foi porteiro morador em Santarem teemos por bem que el seja da qui em deante pousado eescusado de pagar jugada // e outrossii de teer cavalo ede servir per mar nem per terra por quanto ora ele deu hum cavalo que tiinha per nosso mandado pera encaval // gaduras dos ingreses. Porem mandamos a quaees quer juizes e justiças coudees oficiaaes dos nossos Regnos que esto ouverem de veer // queo ajam da qui endeante por pousado e lhi aguardem e façam guardar todalas honrras e direitos e privilégios e liberdades que ham e devem // daver os que per hidade de seteenta anos som poussados per nossas cartas e privilegio que ham. E que o nom constrangam nem mandem // constranger que page a dicta jugada nem tenha cavalo nem sirva per mar nem per terra posto que aja acontia dobrada per que // deva de teer cavalo por quanto nossa mercee he de ser desto scusado. E em testemunho desto lhe mandamos dar esta nossa // carta. Dante em Lixboa bii dias dagosto El Rey o mandou per

68 Chancery of D. Fernando, Book 3, folio 8 verso, document 1.

Joham Gonçalvez seu vasalo e chanceler dos seelos da sua puridade // Gonçalo Lourenço a fez. Era de mil e IIII^c e XIX anos.

Translation

Dom Fernando, by the grace of God King of Portugal and of the Algarve, to all to whom these presents shall come, be it known that we wish to do grace and favour to Joham Gonçalvez who had been a porter resident in Santarem, and we wish it so that from now on he be retired, exempt from paying «jugada»⁶⁹ and likewise exempt from owning a horse, from serving on land and sea, for having recently given us a horse he owned by our command in order to mount the English. Yet we order any judges and justices, «coudéis»⁷⁰, officers of our Kingdoms who see these presents to henceforth consider him exempt, and to preserve and make it so that all his honours and rights and privileges and freedoms be preserved, as is the due of all those who are retired by our letters and their privileges because they are 70 years in age. And that they don't constrain him neither order that he be constrained to pay the aforementioned «jugada», neither to own a horse nor to serve on land or sea, even if he has double the amount for which he should own a horse. Because it is my favour that he be excused from it. In witness thereof we grant him this letter. Given in Lisbon, bii days of August. The King so ordered it through Joham Gonçalvez, his vassal and chancellor of the seals of his purity⁷¹. Gonçalo Lourenço made it. Era of a thousand and IIII^c and XIX years⁷².

Fecha de recepción: junio de 2023.

Fecha de aceptación: septiembre de 2023.

69 «Jugada»: tribute paid according to the number of oxen owned.

70 «Coudéis»: officers appointed by the king and in charge of the militar recruitment of the kingdom's residents.

71 I.e., *escrivão da puridade*, lit. 'scribe of purity', that is, the king's own secretary.

72 This letter employs the Era of Caesar or Spanish Era, 38 years ahead of the Christian Era. Only in 1422 would a royal letter from King João I order that the year of Christ's birth be adopted in the documentary records.